The Central Question
If we look at the development of warfare in the
modern
era, we see three distinct generations. In the United States, the Army
and the Marine Corps are now coming to grips with the change to the
third
generation. This transition is entirely for the good. However, third
generation
warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the
spring
of 1918. It is now more than 70 years old. This suggests some
interesting
questions: Is it not about time for a fourth generation to appear? If
so,
what might it look like? These questions are of central importance. Whoever
is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change
can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to
adapt
to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.
Our purpose here is less to answer these
questions than
to pose them. Nonetheless, we will offer some tentative answers.
To begin to see what these might be, we need to put the questions into
historical context.
Three Generations of Warfare
While military development is generally a
continuous
evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in
which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern
military
development comprises three distinct generations.
First generation warfare reflects tactics
of the
era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column.
These
tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors —
the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a
high
rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and
ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected
both
the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of
conscripted
troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the
smoothbore
by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics survive
today,
especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the
battlefield.[...
]
Second generation warfare was a response
to the
rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and
indirect
fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained
essentially
linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in
the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small
groups.
Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy
reliance
on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the
French
maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed
firepower
replaced massed manpower.[...]
While ideas played a role in the development of
second
generation tactics (particularly the idea of lateral dispersion), technology
was the principal driver of change.[...]
Third generation warfare was also a
response to
the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was
primarily ideas.
Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their
weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed
radically
new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation
tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack
relied
on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather
than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth
and
often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a
counterattack.
While the basic concepts of third generation
tactics
were in place by the end of 1918, the addition of a new
technological
element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the operational level in
World
War II. That shift was blitzkrieg.[...]
Thus we see two major catalysts for change in
previous
generational shifts: technology and ideas. What perspective do we
gain
from these earlier shifts as we look toward a potential fourth
generation
of warfare?
Elements That Carry Over
Earlier generational shifts, especially the shift
from
the second to the third generation, were marked by growing emphasis on
several central ideas. Four of these seem likely to carry over into the
fourth generation, and indeed to expand their influence.
The first is mission orders. Each
generational
change has been marked by greater dispersion on the battlefield. The
fourth
generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy's
society.[...]
Second is decreasing dependence on
centralized
logistics. Dispersion, coupled with increased value placed on tempo,
will
require a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy.
Third is more emphasis on maneuver. Mass,
of men
or fire power, will no longer be an overwhelming factor. In fact, mass
may become a disadvantage as it will be easy to target. Small, highly
maneuverable,
agile forces will tend to dominate.
Fourth is a goal of collapsing the enemy
internally
rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things
as the population's support for the war and the enemy's culture.
Correct
identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly
important.
In broad terms, fourth generation warfare
seems
likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction
between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It
will
be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable
battlefields
or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may
disappear. Actions will occur
concurrently throughout
all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not
just
a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed
communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities
because
of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents,
such
as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including
knowledge
as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on
effectiveness
in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become
very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third
generation
warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.
Potential Technology-Driven Fourth
Generation
If we combine the above general characteristics
of fourth
generation warfare with new technology, we see one possible outline of
the new generation. For example, directed energy may permit
small
elements to destroy targets they could not attack with conventional
energy
weapons. Directed energy may permit the achievement of EMP
(electromagnetic
pulse) effects without a nuclear blast.[...]
Leaders will have to be masters of both the art
of war
and technology, a difficult combination as two different mindsets are
involved.
Primary challenges facing commanders at all levels will include target
selection (which will be a political and cultural, not just a military,
decision), the ability to concentrate suddenly from very wide
dispersion,
and selection of subordinates who can manage the challenge of minimal
or
no supervision in a rapidly changing environment.[...]
Psychological operations may become the dominant
operational
and strategic weapon in the form of
media/information intervention. Logic bombs and
computer
viruses, including latent viruses, may be used to disrupt civilian as
well
as military operations. Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at
manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point
where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude
the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy
population's
support of its government and the war. Television news may become a
more
powerful operational weapon than armored divisions. [...]
A major caveat must be placed on the possibility
of a
technologically driven fourth generation, at least in the American
context.
Even if the technological state of the art permits a high-technology
fourth
generation and this is not clearly the case — the technology itself
must
be translated into weapons that are effective in actual combat. At
present,
our research, development, and procurement process has great difficulty
making this transition. It often produces weapons that incorporate high
technology irrelevant in combat or too complex to work in the chaos of
combat. Too many so-called "smart" weapons provide examples; in combat
they are easy to counter, fail of their own complexity, or make
impossible
demands on their operators. The current American research, development,
and procurement process may simply not be able to make the transition
to
a militarily effective fourth generation of weapons.
A Potential Idea-Driven Fourth Generation
Technology was the primary driver of the second
generation
of warfare; ideas were the primary driver of the third. An idea-based
fourth
generation is also conceivable. For about the last 500 years, the West
has defined warfare. For a military to be effective it generally had to
follow Western models. Because the West's strength is technology, it
may
tend to conceive of a fourth generation in technological terms.
However, the West no longer dominates the world. A
fourth generation may emerge from non-Western cultural traditions,
such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions. The fact that some
non-Western
areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead
them to develop a fourth generation through ideas rather than
technology.
The genesis of an idea-based fourth generation
may be
visible in terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is fourth
generation
warfare, but rather that elements of it may be signs pointing toward a
fourth generation. Some elements in terrorism appear to reflect the
previously
noted "carryovers" from third generation war fare. The more successful
terrorists appear to operate on broad mission orders that carry down to
the level of the individual terrorist. The 'battlefield" is highly
dispersed
and includes the whole of the enemy's society. The terrorist lives
almost
completely off the land and the enemy. Terrorism is very much a matter
of maneuver: the terrorist's firepower is small, and where and when he
applies it is critical.
Two additional carryovers must be noted as they
may be
useful "signposts" pointing toward the fourth generation. The first is
a component of collapsing the enemy. It is a shift in focus from the
enemy's
front to his rear.[...] Terrorism takes this a major step further. It
attempts
to bypass the enemy's military entirely and strike directly at his
homeland
at civilian targets. Ideally, the enemy's military is simply irrelevant
to the terrorist.
The second signpost is the way terrorism seeks to
use
the enemy's strength against him.[...]
Terrorists use a free society's freedom and
openness,
its greatest strengths, against it. They can move freely within our
society
while actively working to subvert it. They use our democratic rights
not
only to penetrate but also to defend themselves.[...] If we are forced
to set aside our own system of legal protections to deal with
terrorists,
the terrorists win another sort of victory. [...]
The contradiction between the military culture
and the
nature of modern war confronts a traditional military Service with a
dilemma.
Terrorists resolve the dilemma by eliminating the culture of order.
Terrorists
do not have uniforms, drill, saluting or, for the most part, ranks.
Potentially,
they have or could develop a military culture that is consistent with
the
disorderly nature of modern war. The fact that their broader culture
may
be non-Western may facilitate this development.
Even in equipment, terrorism may point
toward
signs of a change in generations. Typically, an older
generation requires much greater resources to
achieve
a given end than does its successor. Today, the
United States is spending $500 million apiece for
stealth
bombers. A terrorist stealth bomber is a car with a bomb in the trunk—a
car that looks like every other car.
Terrorism, Technology, and Beyond
Again, we are not suggesting terrorism is the
fourth
generation. It is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven
largely
ineffective. However, what do we see if we combine terrorism with some
of the new technology we have discussed? For example, that
effectiveness
might the terrorist have if his car bomb were a product of genetic
engineering
rather than high explosives? To draw our potential fourth generation
out
still further, what if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the
following additional elements?
A non-national or transnational base, such
as an
ideology or religion. Our national security capabilities are designed
to
operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they
have
great difficulties. The drug war provides an example.[...]
A direct attack on the enemy's culture.
Such an
attack works from within as well as from without. It can bypass not
only
the enemy's military but the state itself. The United States is already
suffering heavily from such a cultural attack in the form of the drug
traffic.
Drugs directly attack our culture. They have the support of a powerful
"fifth column," the drug buyers. They bypass the entire state apparatus
despite our best efforts. Some ideological elements in South America
see
drugs as a weapon; they call them the "poor man's intercontinental
ballistic
missile.".[...]
Highly sophisticated psychological warfare,
especially
through manipulation of the media, particularly television news. Some
terrorists
already know how to play this game. More broadly, hostile forces could
easily take advantage of a significant product of television reporting
— the fact that on television the enemy's casualties can be almost as
devastating
on the home front as are friendly casualties.[...]
All of these elements already exist... Would such
a combination
constitute at least the beginnings of a fourth generation of warfare?
One
thought that suggests they might is that third (not to speak of second)
generation militaries would seem to have little capability against such
a synthesis. This is typical of generational shifts.
The purpose of this paper is to pose a
question, not to
answer it. The partial answers suggested here may in fact prove to be
false
leads. But in view of the fact that third generation warfare is now
over
70 years old, we should be asking ourselves the question, what
will the fourth generation be?
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